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Collaborative hierarchy maintains 
cooperation in asymmetric games
Alberto Antonioni1,2,3, María Pereda2,4,5, Katherine A. Cronin6, Marco Tomassini7 &  
Angel Sánchez  2,3,4,8
The interplay of social structure and cooperative behavior is under much scrutiny lately as behavior 
in social contexts becomes increasingly relevant for everyday life. Earlier experimental work showed 
that the existence of a social hierarchy, earned through competition, was detrimental for the evolution 
of cooperative behaviors. Here, we study the case in which individuals are ranked in a hierarchical 
structure based on their performance in a collective effort by having them play a Public Goods Game. In 
the first treatment, participants are ranked according to group earnings while, in the second treatment, 
their rankings are based on individual earnings. Subsequently, participants play asymmetric Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games where higher-ranked players gain more than lower ones. Our experiments show that 
there are no detrimental effects of the hierarchy formed based on group performance, yet when ranking 
is assigned individually we observe a decrease in cooperation. Our results show that different levels of 
cooperation arise from the fact that subjects are interpreting rankings as a reputation which carries 
information about which subjects were cooperators in the previous phase. Our results demonstrate 
that noting the manner in which a hierarchy is established is essential for understanding its effects on 
cooperation.
While cooperation is common in many species1–3, humans show this trait to a dramatically larger extent. Th s is 
evident in our unparalleled capability to cooperate with strangers in one-shot interactions and on a very large 
scale4–6. The emerging phenomenon of cooperation can involve working together with others in a mutually ben-
efic al activity (i.e., a form of mutualism7), or incurring a costly action that helps others, thus reducing one’s own 
chances for survival under natural selection (i.e., altruism8). Both types of cooperation are ubiquitous in our 
daily lives, and constitute the pillar on which our society is built and functions9. However, for all its importance, 
the interplay between social structure and cooperative behavior in humans has received little attention10. In this 
context, it has been shown that active partner choice, i.e., the possibility to choose interaction partners at will or 
through assortment11, does lead to the establishment of cooperation12,13. However, past experimental work has 
rarely allowed social interaction, employing paradigms where all individuals were equal and anonymous, and 
choices motivated only by informational cues (i.e., reputation14–16,).
In most social interactions, some degree of asymmetry or inequality between positions in the network is a 
key factor. Particularly among primates, hierarchy or ranking is a determinant factor in the decision to work 
with another individual1,10. Even the mere presence of another, differently ranked subject has been shown to dra-
matically affect individuals’ performance17. Once not all individuals have the same strategic options and/or the 
consequences of their actions differ, those in a superior position can reap more benefits from cooperative actions 
at the expense of their partners, which in turn may lead the latter to stop cooperating. It has been shown recently18 
that this is also the case in experiments with humans designed similarly to setups employed with primates19,20: 
Lower ranked subjects contribute less to a common goal when they benefit less than their partners. Interestingly, 
this appears to be due to the fact that when higher ranked subjects can coerce their counterparts into cooperating, 
they very often do so21 by resorting to so-called zero-determinant strategies22,23. It thus seems that the existence 
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of a social structure, in the form of a ranking or a hierarchy, can have detrimental effects in the stability of coop-
eration among humans.
In this study we want to probe further into the interplay of social structure and cooperation by considering a 
different type of hierarchy. Th s is by no means an academic question in so far as hierarchies differ among primate 
species in their steepness and their linearity24, and organizations in our society come in very different flavors and 
structures25. Therefore, here we set out to study how cooperation is affected when hierarchies are not linear but 
instead there is more than one individual at each ranking level. Additionally, we contribute to the knowledge of 
cooperation on hierarchical structure by considering the case in which one’s ranking arises through competition 
with all others as in18, or through some amount of cooperation. We study these issues by means of a novel exper-
imental design, which, as we will see below, allow us to shed light on hitherto unexplored facets of cooperative 
behavior. As shown in previous experimental works8,26–29, when pairwise interactions are repeated for a reason-
ably large number of rounds the mutual cooperation outcome is easier to achieve. Here, we employ a setting for 
testing the impact of hierarchy formation in short, but not one-shot, interactions, avoiding the direct reciprocity 
mechanism present for longer time encounters.
Experimental Setup
The experimental setup we introduce in this work consists of three treatments, namely Selfish (or Competitive) 
Hierarchy (SH), Collaborative Hierarchy (CH) and Random Hierarchy (RH). The SH and CH treatments include 
two phases, named Phase I and Phase II, while RH treatments include only Phase II. All treatments involved 
exactly 24 participants per experimental session and participants’ scores were expressed in Experimental 
Currency Units (ECUs). However, only ECUs accumulated during Phase II were converted to real money at the 
end of the experimental session at an exchange rate of 80 ECUs = 1EUR. During Phase I participants in the SH 
and CH treatments acquired one hierarchy profile of four possible levels, called A, B, C, and D. Participants play-
ing the RH treatment began the experiment directly at Phase II, with one of the four hierarchy profiles assigned 
to them at random. The four hierarchy profiles were equally represented in all the treatments, that is, there were 
six participants in each hierarchy profile. A translation of the exact experimental instructions can be found in the 
Supplementary Information (SI), see Section 1.
Phase I: Hierarchy formation. During Phase I participants were randomly assigned to six groups of four 
participants and they played a Public Goods Game (PGG30,) within their groups for 15 rounds. The exact number 
of PGG rounds was unknown to participants who only knew that they had to play for at least 10 rounds. At the 
beginning of each round all participants decided how many points between 0 and 10 (one choice among options: 
0, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10) they wanted to contribute to the group common pool from their round endowment of 10 
ECUs. The group common pool was then multiplied by two and then equally distributed to the four members of 
the group. Before proceeding to the following round participants received feedback on their group’s contribution 
level and on their individual payoff while they had no information on the situation of the other groups. In SH 
and CH treatments, hierarchy profiles were assigned at the end of Phase I according to the payoffs accumulated 
during the PGG. Phase I was skipped in RH treatments and hierarchy profiles were randomly distributed among 
all 24 participants. Th s last treatment was included because in previous experiments18 the effect of hierarchy did 
not depend on whether one’s own position was earned in a competition or received randomly, and we sought to 
measure whether this counter-intuitive phenomenon would replicate here.
The difference between the SH and CH treatments arises in how the PGG is used to assign a position in the 
hierarchy. Both hierarchy assignment procedures are summarized in Fig. 1. In SH treatments the ranking of par-
ticipants was computed according to the points each individual accumulated during Phase I. The six participants 
Figure 1. Sketch of the hierarchy assignment procedures. The 24 participants are ranked with respect to their 
cumulated payoff at the end of Phase I (numbers from 1 to 24) while the six groups are ranked according to 
the sum of individual payoffs of their group components. The four hierarchy profiles are divided into two class 
types: high (A,B) and low (C,D).
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ranking highest were assigned to the fi st hierarchy profile (A), the next six participants to the second hierar-
chy profile (B), the next six participants to the third hierarchy profile (C), while the last six participants were 
assigned to the fourth hierarchy profile (D). On the other hand, in CH treatments, the ranking was computed 
according not based on the points individuals earned by themselves but rather to the points earned by their 
group as a whole. The four participants belonging to the highest-ranked group and the best two participants of 
the second highest-ranked group were assigned to hierarchy profile A, the other two participants of the second 
highest-ranked group and the participants of the third highest-ranked group to the B profile, and so forth for the 
other two hierarchy profiles. In other words, in SH treatments only individual performance mattered, whereas 
in CH treatments it was important to contribute to the group effort to ensure a good ranking for oneself. Before 
starting Phase II all participants were assigned to a hierarchy profile according to the experimental treatment 
condition they were assigned.
Phase II: Cooperation in a hierarchical structure. During Phase II participants in all treatments played 
an Asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma (APD) game in which their payoffs were biased according to their hierarchy 
profile. Phase II was the same for all three experimental treatments and it consisted of playing five APD games 
of ten rounds. The exact number of rounds was unknown to participants who only knew that they had to play 
for at least 5 rounds. Participants were assigned to dyads to play the APD game five times. Dyads were formed 
using a random permutation of participants, so each individual met all hierarchy profiles once with the exception 
of their own hierarchy profile which they met twice. The APD game was created using the standard payoffs of a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game where mutual cooperation is paid R = 3, mutual defection P = 2, cooperation to defec-
tion S = 1, and defection to cooperation T = 4. However, the actual payoffs that participants received at the end 
of an APD round were then multiplied by a multiplication factor mH which depended on their hierarchy profile 
H = {A,B,C,D}, where mA = 5, mB = 4, mC = 3, mD = 2. For instance, a B-profile cooperator against a C-profile 
defector receives mB × S = 4 × 1 = 4 points while the other gets mC × T = 3 × 4 = 12 points; two cooperators of the 
same hierarchy profile A receive both mA × R = 5 × 3 = 15 points.
After reading the detailed instructions of the experiment and answering some trial questions, participants 
played two repetitions of their assigned treatment, that is, (Phase I + Phase II) for SH and CH treatments and 
Phase II for the RH treatment. We excluded automatic answers from the analysis and analyzed only participants’ 
decisions in the second repetition treatment in order to consider behavior after the learning stage (during the 
fi st repetition). Before each treatment repetition, a random reshuffl g of participants was performed such that 
participants did not play against the same participant twice. We performed SH and CH treatments during four 
experimental sessions each, for a total of eight sessions. The RH treatments were run during three additional ses-
sions. All sessions included exactly 24 individuals who did not participate in any other session of the experiment, 
for a total of 264 subjects.
Results
Phase I: Hierarchy formation. We begin the presentation of our results by addressing the level of coop-
eration during Phase I in the SH and CH treatments; this phase was not included in the RH treatments. Figure 2 
shows the average contribution over the 15 rounds of the Public Goods Game (PGG) played during Phase I. 
Participants cooperated ostensibly more in CH treatments than SH treatments, likely aiming to increase their 
group ranking position and thus obtain a higher hierarchy profile for Phase II. Th s is in agreement with theo-
retical predictions31. In fact, we must take into account that in SH treatments homo economicus individuals only 
Figure 2. Cooperation during Phase I. Participants’ average PGG contribution as a function of the round 
number and over the entire phase (inset box) for both experimental treatments. Participants cooperated less 
in SH treatments, in which individual payoffs determine rank, compared to CH treatments, in which group 
earnings determine rank. (comparison of SH and CH treatment groups: MW U = 134, **p < 0.002). Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean over all treatments.
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benefit from maximizing their individual earnings, i.e. contributing no points to the group common pool, while 
in CH treatments their individual utility function corresponds to the maximization of their group payoff, i.e. con-
tributing all the points of their round endowment. Of course, since points earned in Phase I were not converted 
to real money, the main assumption here is that rational individuals desire to attain the highest hierarchy profile 
which then allowed them to earn more points that would be converted to real money during Phase II. The fact 
that the observed behavior is similar to the results in paid, standard PGGs30 gives us confide ce in our interpre-
tation that players are seeking to maximize individual payoffs in the SH and seeking to maximize total group 
earnings in the CH treatment.
Phase II: Asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma games. We now turn to the level of cooperation during 
Phase II for the three experimental treatments. Fig. 3 depicts the average level of cooperation in APD games per 
round. We note that the number of rounds was not known by participants and the game was iterated against the 
same partner for ten rounds. As is generally the case in these paradigms, the cooperation level decreased for all 
treatments as a function of the number of rounds. Participants’ behaviors in the CH and RH treatments were sim-
ilar to each other, but each different from the SH treatment (Fig. 3). Th s may be due to participants’ perceptions 
being framed differently dependent upon the way in which hierarchy profiles were obtained. We also report in 
Figure S5 participants’ behavior as a function of the round number separated for the five dyadic interactions (see 
SI Section 2).
Let us now consider how cooperative behavior differs when playing against the same or a different hierarchy 
profile. By doing so, we can compare whether the level of cooperation in symmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma games 
differs from those observed in APD games or, in other words, whether the existence of a hierarchy leading to dif-
ferent earnings in the game for the two players has an effect. In fact, when two participants having the same hier-
archy profile are paired during Phase II, the APD game can be interpreted as a symmetric one. In Fig. 4 we report 
the average cooperation level in the three experimental treatments for asymmetric and symmetric interactions 
(see also Figs S6–S7 in SI Section 2). We observe that in SH treatments participants cooperate at similar levels 
when playing against an individual of the same or a different hierarchy profile. On the other hand, individuals in 
CH and RH treatments cooperate, on average, more often in symmetric interactions with respect to asymmetric 
ones. However, this difference is more difficult to assess when looking at cooperation levels over the ten rounds, 
see Figure S6 for more details. Moreover, while cooperation levels appear similar in asymmetric pairings for CH 
and RH treatments, we notice that symmetric games in RH treatments show an even higher level of cooperation 
with respect to the one observed in CH treatments. Our fi ding that in two treatments asymmetry is detrimental 
for cooperation is in line with experiments on the asymmetric PD available in the literature28,32. Interestingly, the 
effect of the ranking in SH treatments appears to be larger than the decrease due to asymmetric interactions. In 
fact, cooperation levels are very similar both in symmetric and asymmetric pairings, implying that subjects were 
more affected by the ranking procedure than by the resulting hierarchy profiles. For further results on partici-
pants’ behavior against all hierarchy profiles during Phase II (Figure S8) and during first rounds (Figure S9) we 
refer the reader to Section 4 of the SI.
A more detailed analysis provides insight on the overall individual cooperative behavior of participants during 
Phase II. Fig. 5 shows the proportion of participants for the three experimental treatments according to their aver-
age cooperation frequency. For the sake of simplicity, we classify hierarchy profiles into two levels, i.e. high and 
Figure 3. Cooperation during Phase II. Participants’ average APD cooperation frequency as a function of the 
round number and over the entire phase (inset box) for all experimental treatments. Participants cooperate 
to the same extent in CH and RH treatments and at all time less frequently in SH treatments (comparison of 
pairwise interaction average cooperation level distributions: SH-CH MW U = 34448, ***p < 0.001; SH-RH MW 
U = 16636, ***p < 0.001; CH-RH MW U = 20988, p = 0.618). Error bars represent standard error of the mean 
over all treatments.
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low, where A and B profiles are considered as high rank profiles while C and D as low rank ones, see also Fig. 1. 
The fi st conclusion one can draw from this analysis is that the behavior is rather heterogenous for all three treat-
ments. In fact, we observe nearly the full possible range of cooperation frequencies, ranging from individuals who 
cooperate in almost all interactions to individuals who never do, although the latter are much more frequent in all 
treatments. We can thus classify players into three classes of general behavior: defectors, conditional cooperators 
and cooperators. We defi e defectors, representing the majority of participants in all treatments, as individuals 
who cooperate less than 20% of the time, and we defi e cooperators similarly as individuals who have coopera-
tion frequency higher than 80%. We refer to the rest of the population as conditional cooperators. Furthermore, 
since we can fi d the three kinds of individuals in both hierarchy levels, it appears that the hierarchy profile of a 
participant does not influence the average cooperative behavior of that individual.
Finally, we analyze the individual behavior of participants when facing low or high hierarchy profiles. In order 
to do so, we defi e a measure which takes into account the influence of the hierarchy profile on the cooperation 
level of an individual: For each participant, we obtain her cooperation frequency f (between 0 and 1) against her 
own and the other hierarchy level, i.e. flow and fhigh. For instance, a participant with flow = 0.7 cooperated 70% of the 
time against low profile participants. We now defi e the hierarchy influence H between −1 and 1, as in Eq. 1, for 
each participant as the difference:
= −H f f (1)high low
Thus, a participant who always cooperates with low profile participants and never with high profile participants 
will have flow = 1 and fhigh = 0 leading to a hierarchy influence H = −1. Conversely, a participant who cooper-
ates only and always with high profile participants will have H = 1. Finally, a participant who cooperates equally 
with both types has H = 0. Summarizing, a player who only cooperates with high profiles has a high H because 
she is affected by high profiles, and by low profiles at the same time in the opposite way, changing her behavior 
according to the partner’s profile. A player with hierarchy influence equal to zero cooperates to the same extent 
with all hierarchies. A player with negative hierarchy influence cooperates more with low profiles. Figure 6 shows 
the histograms of participants’ H for the three experimental treatments and for both hierarchy profiles. We can 
observe that the influence of the high hierarchy profiles is stronger in CH treatments than in the baseline scenario 
of RH treatments. Indeed, we fi d that the histogram is clearly skewed towards positive values. On the contrary, 
for SH treatments we observe the opposite effect, namely that the histogram is skewed towards negative values. 
Interestingly, we observe that low and high hierarchy profile participants appear to be equally distributed over the 
entire space for SH and CH treatments, again indicating that one’s own profile does not condition the subjects’ 
actions as much as that of the counterpart. However, we fi d a different hierarchy influence in RH treatments as 
participants tend to cooperate more frequently with partners belonging to their same hierarchy type. For further 
analysis on the hierarchy influence we refer the reader to Sections 5 and 6 of the SI where we present detailed 
scatterplots on participants’ fhigh and flow values.
Discussion
In this paper, we have reported on experiments measuring how the way a ranking, or a hierarchy, is established in 
a group may affect cooperation in that group. The hierarchy formation phase (Phase I) produced results that were 
interesting on their own; in particular we observed that group competition increases contributions in the Public 
Figure 4. Cooperation in symmetric and asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Participants’ average 
cooperation frequency for the three experimental treatments and for symmetric (lighter colors) and asymmetric 
(darker colors) interactions. Unbalanced interactions lead to lower levels of cooperation in RH treatments 
and, to a certain extent, in CH treatments (comparison of individual action distributions in symmetric and 
asymmetric interactions: SH treatments MW U = 2783500, p = 0.607; CH treatments MW U = 2866600, 
**p < 0.010; RH treatments MW U = 1687000, ***p < 0.001). Error bars represent standard error of the mean 
over all dyadic interactions.
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Goods Game (PGG) dilemma. While this seems to arise simply from the fact that in Collaborative Hierarchy 
(CH) treatments subjects must promote their group earnings, there are subtleties in the design that must be taken 
into account in the discussion. Indeed, in Selfish Hierarchy (SH) treatments competition among groups is always 
present, meaning that theoretical predictions on the classical tragedy of the commons problem31 do not completely 
hold. Th s is due to the fact that groups mostly composed of cooperators can - in terms of individual payoffs - out-
perform groups composed of a majority of defectors. As a result, even in SH treatments individuals belonging to 
generous groups may achieve higher hierarchy profiles than individuals in groups where nobody contributes. On 
the other hand, in CH treatments there is almost no incentive towards a non-cooperative behavior. Considering 
the cooperation phase when participants play the Asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma (APD) game, our fi st fi d-
ing is that cooperative hierarchy formation does not lead to higher cooperation but, instead, in SH treatments 
subjects cooperate less. In fact, in CH treatments higher hierarchy profiles are acquired by ensuring one’s group 
does well, in contrast to SH treatments in which participants who defect more in their group more frequently 
acquire higher hierarchy profiles. The cooperative behavior in Random Hierarchy (RH) treatments represents the 
Figure 5. Individual cooperation during Phase II. Ratio of participants as a function of their average APD 
cooperation frequency and for all treatments. We defi e defectors as participants who cooperate less than 20% 
of the times and cooperators as subjects cooperating in almost all interactions (>80%). Participants having a 
cooperation frequency between 20% and 80% are classifi d as conditional cooperators. We observe the three 
participant categories in all treatments with a large prevalence of defectors and conditional cooperators with 
respect to pure cooperators. Hierarchy profile types are homogeneously distributed among cooperation 
frequencies (comparison of individual cooperation frequency distributions of low and high hierarchy profiles: 
SH treatments MW U = 1138.5, p = 0.923; CH treatments MW U = 1317, p = 0.224; RH treatments MW 
U = 693.5, p = 0.611).
Figure 6. Hierarchy influence. Histograms of participants value of H (see text) for the three considered 
treatments. Results are plotted excluding pure defectors, i.e., participants with near zero H values. Mean values 
aggregated for all participants and for hierarchy profile classes are reported as inset. We observe more frequently 
low values of H in SH treatments (53 subjects, distribution skewness γSH = −0.097) with respect to the high 
values found in CH treatments (68 subjects, γCH = 0.327). Although negatively skewed, overall values in RH 
treatments (52 subjects, γRH = −0.506) were less scattered and more centered around zero. Again, hierarchy 
profile types are homogeneously distributed among all hierarchy influence values in SH and CH treatments 
although hierarchy influence profiles appear dependent on participants’ hierarchy type in RH treatments 
(comparison of hierarchy influence distributions of low and high types; SH treatments MW U = 381.5, 
P = 0.593; CH treatments MW U = 627.5, P = 0.547; RH treatments MW U = 452.5, *P = 0.035).
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baseline scenario in which no framing on hierarchy profiles is introduced. It thus appears that individuals taking 
part in SH treatments cooperate sensibly less after performing the competitive task in their Phase I. Instead, look-
ing at CH treatment results, performing a collaborative task during Phase I does not increase the average level of 
cooperation with respect to what happens in RH treatments where such a task is not present. It is interesting to 
note that the change in the cooperation level across treatments in Phase II is similar to what we observed in Phase 
I. We thus conclude that the CH treatment hierarchy assignment protocol does not increase cooperativeness but,
instead, that the competition introduced in SH treatments decreases it.
What is the mechanism behind the detrimental effect of the individual hierarchy on cooperation? A fi st 
possibility is that, as in previous experiments18, spite leads low ranking individuals to cooperate less with high 
ranking ones. However, there is a crucial difference with the results reported in18, namely the fact that, upon suc-
cessful cooperation, the higher ranked subject decides how the reward is split. Th s means that the reason for the 
low cooperativeness of lower ranked subjects could be spite, but could also be uncertainty about the benefit they 
would receive from their cooperation. In the setup we have studied here, there is no agency from the subjects: 
higher ranked participants receive more from the interaction because it is so stipulated by the game setting, and 
hence there is no uncertainty about the outcome of the interaction. Thus, we are left only with spite as a possible 
explanation of the low cooperativeness in SH treatments. However, if this factor was present, it should similarly 
affect the CH treatment, as there are always lower ranked and high ranked people. On the contrary, we observe 
cooperation with higher-ranked partners. While such behavior could be induced by the more cooperative hier-
archy formation phase, we believe this is unlikely and that, as we discuss below, the mechanism at work is com-
pletely different. The key observation here is that, contrary to what was observed in18, a random assignment of 
ranking does not have any effect on cooperation as compared to CH treatments, and the observed cooperation is 
larger than in SH ones. We believe that this implies that subjects are not interpreting ranking as hierarchy because, 
as it has been already mentioned above, there is no agency from higher-ranked partners.
In the fi ld of animal behavior, it is generally accepted that hierarchies are linked to the possibility of monop-
olizing access to resources and that, as a consequence, the ability of high ranking individuals to monopolize such 
access will predict tolerance about groupmates and the quality of social relationships in general33,34. We posit that 
the same ideas apply here, and the fact that the distribution of resources is exogenous and non-monopolizable 
strips ranking of its meaning. Key to this point is the realization that what a subject earns in the asymmetric PD 
depends, as far as hierarchy is concerned, on her own hierarchy, and not on that of her counterpart. We thus con-
clude that the power to affect others’ earning is crucial to establish a hierarchy, as shown by the different levels of 
cooperation emerging from SH and RH treatments in this experiment. The other conclusion we can draw from 
this observation is that high hierarchy profiles in CH treatments elicit more cooperation because of the way in 
which hierarchy itself is obtained, i.e., by cooperating in the PGG. High ranking is then interpreted as reputation 
in so far as it has been obtained by cooperating more and making the group successful. Therefore, subjects are 
inclined to cooperate with those identifi d as cooperative. Individuals have earned their rank positions through 
past behavior and thus their rank may be an honest signal of their future likelihood of cooperating. People are 
likely noting rank in their interactions and responding accordingly with their own decision to cooperate or defect 
in a way that maximizes their own gains. Th s would be compatible with the fact that, in SH treatments, partic-
ipants having high hierarchy positions cheated more in the PGG, and as a consequence they were punished by 
experiencing less cooperation from future partners. In this treatment, participants would cooperate more with 
lower hierarchy profiles because they are perceived as cooperators, and therefore as ‘losers’ in the battle for hier-
archy. RH treatments support this interpretation in so far as the hierarchy influence histogram is not skewed, so 
most people cooperate equally with partners of any level since in this treatment hierarchy does not signal previous 
cooperative behavior.
Methods
All participants in the experiments reported in the manuscript signed an informed consent to participate. In 
agreement with the Spanish Law for Personal Data Protection, their anonymity was always preserved. Th s pro-
cedure was approved by the Ethics Committee of Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, the institution responsible 
for funding the experiment, and the experiment was subsequently carried out in accordance with the approved 
guidelines. The laboratory experiments were carried out with volunteers chosen among the LINEEX subject pool 
for the SH and CH treatments and among the IBSEN subject pool for RH treatments. The fi st set of experiments 
corresponded to eight sessions, four sessions of SH treatments and four sessions of CH treatments, and they 
were performed at the LINEEX experimental laboratory at different dates between the 16th and the 20th of 
May, 2016. The second set of experiments included three sessions of RH treatments and it was performed at the 
computer laboratory of the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid on November 29th, December 2nd and 14th, 2016. 
Participants played through a web interface specifi ally designed in o-Tree35 for the experiment accessible from 
the computers of the laboratories. At least three researchers supervised the experiment in the room, preventing 
any interaction among the participants. Participants were not allowed to talk or signal in any way. In order to 
further guarantee that potential interactions among players seated next to each other in the room did not influ-
ence results, assignment to computer stations was random and stations were isolated from each other by opaque 
panels. Hence there was no relationship between physical proximity and interactions in the game. Before making 
decisions, participants read detailed instructions and responded to a set of control questions in order to insure 
common understanding of the game and on the computation of payoffs. Once all questions had been answered, 
the fi st phase of the experiment began. A translation of the instructions from the original Spanish version is 
provided, see SI Section 1. Each session lasted about one and a half hours and included 24 participants, for a total 
of 264 subjects taking part in the experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three treatments. 
Participants received a show-up fee of 5 EUR and their personal score in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs) 
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was converted at an exchange rate of 1 EUR = 80 ECUs at the end of the experiment. The average payoff per sub-
ject was 16.2 EUR (about 17.5 US$).
For both phases, comparisons between treatment groups were made using the nonparametric Mann-Whitney 
(MW) test. A nonparametric approach was appropriate for our dataset given that our data did not follow a normal 
distribution and we had a relatively small number of subjects per treatment. Results were considered signifi ant 
when p < 0.05.
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Collaborative hierarchy maintains cooperation
in asymmetric games
Supplementary Information
A. Antonioni, M. Pereda, K. A. Cronin, M. Tomassini, A. Sánchez
In Section 1 of the Supplementary Information (SI) we report translation
from Spanish of the exact instructions form that participants received for
the three experimental treatments, named Selfish Hierarchy (SH), Collabo-
rative Hierarchy (CH), and Random Hierarchy (RH). SH and CH treatments
involved both Phase I and Phase II. Instructions related to SH treatments
only are written in red color while those for CH treatments only are written
in blue color. RH treatments instructions only include those of Introduction
and Phase II. A resumed version of the instructions was always available to
participants during the entire experiment.
Additional results of experimental data that are not shown in the main text
are presented in the following sections. We report time dependence in Sec-
tion 2, participants’ behavior per hierarchy profile in Section 3, and a more
detailed analysis of the hierarchy influence in Section 4 (all participants) and
Section 5 (excluding defectors).
1
1 Instructions (translated from Spanish)
Explanations for this part of the experiment
Welcome to this experiment!
You are going to take decisions that will affect your payoffs as well as the
payoffs of the other participants.
Although all payoffs are expressed in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs),
these points will be transformed into real money at the end of the experiment
according to the following exchange rate:
80 ECUs = 1 EUR
Your total earnings in EUR will be your cumulated ECUs converted to the
nearest integer-value plus a complementary show-up fee of 5 EUR.
During the experiment it is strictly forbidden to talk to other partic-
ipants. If you have a question, please ask the assistants. If you do not
comply with these rules, we will regrettably be obliged to exclude you from
the experiment.
This experiment consists in two phases.
Phase I
Important note: The points you get during Phase I are not going to be
converted to real money, only ECUs you get in Phase II will be converted
into real money.
In this phase you will be assigned to a group of four participants, including
yourself, and you will remain in the same group throughout the entire phase.
This phase consists of at least ten rounds. There will be other 5 groups of 4
participants in the same situation of your group.
At the beginning of each round, you will be provided with an endowment of
ten points. Then, you have to make a decision on how many points (0, 2,
4, 6, 8, 10) of this endowment you want to invest in a common pool. The
points invested by all the participants in your group will be added together
and multiplied by two. Finally, this common pool will be shared equally
among all the participants in your group. You have 30 seconds to take this
decision, otherwise the software will take a random decision at your place.
At the end of this phase you will be assigned to a profile according to the
number of points you [and your group] earned. These profiles (A, B, C, D)
will be assigned as follows.
2
SH treatment instructions (Phase I)
As Fig. S1 shows, at the end of Phase I all the 24 participants in the exper-
iment will be ordered according to the points they have gained during that
phase, where the highest-earning participant is represented by a 1 and the
lowest-earning participant by a 24.
Profile types for Phase II are assigned as follows: the six highest-earning
participants to Profile A (1–6), the next six participants to Profile B (7–12),
the next six participants to Profile C (13–18), and the last six participants
to Profile D (19–24), as shown in S1.
Figure S1: Selfish Hierarchy structure.
For your convenience, a resumed version of these instructions will be available
to you during the entire experiment.
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Example:
In the below figure the 24 participants have been ordered according to their
results obtained during Phase I.
The participant with number 17 is the one with the highest earnings, i.e. 43
points (left-most figure) and obtains the profile type A for Phase II (right-
most figure). The participant with number 4 is the one with the lowest
earnings, i.e. 15 points and obtains the profile type D for Phase II.
Figure S2: Selfish Hierarchy example.
4
CH treatment instructions (Phase I)
As Fig. S3 shows, at the end of Phase I all the 24 participants in the experi-
ment will be ordered according to the points their group has gained and also
according to their individual earnings, where the first group (white group in
Fig. S3) is the group that gained the most, and the last group (the darker
one in Fig. S3) is the group that gained the least.
Profile types for Phase II are assigned as follows: the highest-earning group
and the two highest-earning people of the second highest-earning group to
Profile A, the two lowest-earning people of the second highest-earning group
and the third group to Profile B, the forth highest-earning group and the
two highest-earning people of the fifth highest-earning group to Profile C,
and the two lowest-earning people of the fifth highest-earning group and the
lowest-earning group to Profile D.
Figure S3: Collaborative Hierarchy structure.
For your convenience, a resumed version of these instructions will be available
to you during the entire experiment.
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Example:
In the below figure the 24 participants have been ordered according to their
results obtained during Phase I. The white-colored group is the one with
the highest earnings, i.e. 163 points. Within the white-colored group, the
participant with number 17 is the one with the highest individual earnings,
i.e. 43 points. All the participants belonging to the white-colored group
obtain the profile type A (see right-most figure) for Phase II.
The second group is formed by participants with numbers 6, 8, 22 and 23.
The participant with the number 22 is the one with highest individual earn-
ings with the belonging group while participant with the number 23 is the
one who individually gained less. Consequently, participants with numbers
8 and 22 obtain the profile type A, and participants with numbers 6 and 23
obtain the profile type B.
Figure S4: Collaborative Hierarchy example.
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Phase II
This phase consists of five stages. Each stage consists of at least five rounds.
In each stage, you will be paired to a randomly selected participant, hence-
forward, your partner. You and your partner have to choose an action among
the two following options:
X or Y
These decisions will affect your and your partner’s earnings.
You and your partner will be assigned to a multiplication factor m according
to the profile type you obtained in Phase I. We call here your multiplication
factor as m1 and your partner’s multiplication factor as m2. In the follow-
ing table, you can see which multiplication factor corresponds to each profile.
Profile type A B C D
Multiplication factor m 5 4 3 2
Now we explain the payoffs for each possible combination of your action and
your partner’s action, considering your multiplication factor as m1 and your
partner’s multiplication factor as m2:
 You choose X, your partner chooses X:
you gain 3m1 ECUs and your partner gets 3m2 ECUs.
 You choose X, your partner chooses Y:
you gain 1m1 ECUs and your partner gets 4m2 ECUs.
 You choose Y, your partner chooses X:
you gain 4m1 ECUs and your partner gets 1m2 ECUs.
 You choose Y, your partner chooses Y:
you gain 2m1 ECUs and your partner gets 2m2 ECUs.
For your convenience, a resumed version of these instructions will be available
to you during the entire experiment.
Examples (Phase II):
Your profile type is A and your partner’s one is C. You both choose X. You
gain 3 5 = 15 ECUs while your partner gains 3 3 = 9 ECUs.
Your profile type is B and your partner’s one is A. You choose X and your
partner chooses Y. You gain 1  4 = 4 ECUs while your partner gains
4 5 = 20 ECUs.
7
Trial questions
Before starting the actual experiment we would like to be sure that you and
everybody else has correctly understood the instructions. To this end, please
answer the questions that will appear on your screen. When you are done
with a question click the "OK" button at the bottom of the screen.
(Participants answer the following trial questions after reading the instruc-
tions. Wrong answers were corrected by the software showing the participants
the correct answer and related explanations. Participants were able to begin
the experiment only answering to all questions.)
1. (Phase I only) How many points do you receive as endowment at the
beginning of a round during Phase I?
Correct answer : 10 points.
2. (Phase I only) Suppose that you contribute zero points to the common
pool and that the sum of all contributions in the common pool from
all participants in your group is 20.
Which is your gain at the end of this round?
Correct answer : 20 points.
3. (Phase I only) Suppose that you contribute 10 points to the common
pool and that the sum of all contributions in the common pool from
all participants in your group is 30.
Which is your gain at the end of this round?
Correct answer : 15 points.
4. (Phase I only) Suppose that at the end of Phase I you are the 12th
highest-earning participant among the 24 participants.
Which will your profile type be for Phase II?
Correct answer : B.
5. (Phase I only) Suppose that at the end of Phase I you are the 19th
highest-earning participant among the 24 participants.
Which will your profile type be for Phase II?
Correct answer : D.
6. (Phase I only) Suppose that at the end of Phase I your group is the
third highest-earning one and that you are the third highest-earning
participant within your group.
Which will your profile type be for Phase II?
Correct answer : B.
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7. (Phase I only) Suppose that at the end of Phase I your group is the
fifth highest-earning one and that you are the second highest-earning
participant within your group.
Which will your profile type be for Phase II?
Correct answer : C.
8. (related to Phase II ) Suppose that your profile type is B and your
partner’s one is C. You choose X and your partner chooses Y.
Which is your gain at the end of this round?
Correct answer : 4 points.
9. (related to Phase II ) Suppose that your profile type is D and your
partner’s one is A. You choose Y and your partner chooses X.
Which is your gain at the end of this round?
Correct answer : 8 points.
10. (related to Phase II ) Suppose that your profile type is C and your
partner’s one is D. You choose Y and your partner chooses Y.
Which is your gain at the end of this round?
Correct answer : 6 points.
11. (related to Phase II ) Suppose that your profile type is A and your
partner’s one is B. You choose X and your partner chooses X.
Which is your gain at the end of this round?
Correct answer : 15 points.
9
2 Timedependence
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InFig.S5weplottheaveragecooperationlevelduringPhaseIIforthethree
treatmentsasafunctionoftheroundnumber.Participantsinteractwiththe
samepartnerfortenroundsbeforechangingforanewone. Weobservethat
inaltreatmentsandforaloftheﬁvedyadicinteractionstheglobalpattern
isadecreaseinthecooperationlevel,withahighpickintheﬁrstfewrounds
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FigureS5:Cooperationperroundnumber.AverageAPDcooperation
frequencyforthethreetreatmentsasafunctionoftheroundnumber.Error
barsrepresentstandarderrorofthemean.
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In Fig. S6 we plot the average cooperation level during Phase II for sym-
metric and asymmetric games and for the three treatments. Asymmetric
interactions are considered the ones between participants having a different
hierarchy profile type. We observe that in all treatments the global pattern
is a decrease in the cooperation level. However, while cooperation levels
for symmetric and asymmetric interactions in SH and CH treatments are
rather undistinguishable, participants in RH treatments cooperate sensibly
less with different-profile participants with respect to partners having the
same hierarchy profile type.
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Figure S6: Cooperation in PD games. Average cooperation frequency in
asymmetric and symmetric games for the three treatments as a function of
the round number. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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roundnumber.Again,weobservethatinaltreatmentstheglobalpattern
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oftenthanothersduringinitialroundswhileD-proﬁleparticipantsdefect
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FigureS7: Cooperationperhierarchyproﬁle. Averagecooperation
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functionoftheround.Errorbarsrepresentstandarderrorofthemean.
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3 Hierarchy profile behavior
In Fig. S8 we plot the average cooperation level during Phase II for the four
hierarchy profile types and for the three treatments. As in Fig. S7, we cannot
assess any clear pattern among different hierarchy profiles when looking at
the four types.
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Figure S8: Global cooperation per hierarchy profile. Average coop-
eration frequency for the four hierarchy types and for the three treatments
as a function of partner’s hierarchy profile. Colored bars represent the four
hierarchy types of the partner while gray bars are the global cooperation
frequency per hierarchy profile, i.e. cumulated against all profiles. Error
bars represent standard error of the mean.
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In Fig. S9 we plot the average cooperation level during first rounds in Phase II
for the four hierarchy profile types and for the three treatments. Similarly
to Figs. S7- S8, we cannot assess any clear pattern among different hierarchy
profile types although A-profile participants in RH treatments cooperate
sensibly more frequently than others.
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Figure S9: Cooperation during first interactions. Average cooperation
frequency for the four hierarchy types and for the three treatments as a func-
tion of partner’s hierarchy profile during first rounds. Colored bars represent
the four hierarchy types of the partner while gray bars are the global coop-
eration frequency per hierarchy profile, i.e. cumulated against all profiles.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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4 Hierarchy influence analysis
In Figs. S10, S11 and S12 we present a scatterplot for the three treatments
to show the hierarchy influence H = fhigh   flow value for each participant,
where flow (fhigh) is the cooperation frequency against a low (high) profile
participant. Each point represents a participant and the value H plotted in
Fig. 6 of the main text can be seen as the distance from the point to the
bisector line. When H > 0 participants stand in the upper-left section.
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Figure S10: Hierarchy influence per hierarchy type. Each point repre-
sents a participant during Phase II in SH treatments where its coordinates
are participant’s cooperation frequency fhigh (y-axis) against high hierarchy
profiles, i.e. A- and B-type, and participant’s cooperation frequency flow
(x-axis) against low hierarchy profiles, i.e. C- and D-type. We present mean
values per hierarchy profile for all participants cumulated over all rounds
(crossed diamonds) and during first actions (empty diamonds).
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Figure S11: Hierarchy influence per hierarchy type. Each point repre-
sents a participant during Phase II in CH treatments where its coordinates
are participant’s cooperation frequency fhigh (y-axis) against high hierarchy
profiles, i.e. A- and B-type, and participant’s cooperation frequency flow
(x-axis) against low hierarchy profiles, i.e. C- and D-type. We present mean
values per hierarchy profile for all participants cumulated over all rounds
(crossed diamonds) and during first actions (empty diamonds).
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Figure S12: Hierarchy influence per hierarchy type. Each point repre-
sents a participant during Phase II in RH treatments where its coordinates
are participant’s cooperation frequency fhigh (y-axis) against high hierarchy
profiles, i.e. A- and B-type, and participant’s cooperation frequency flow
(x-axis) against low hierarchy profiles, i.e. C- and D-type. We present mean
values per hierarchy profile for all participants cumulated over all rounds
(crossed diamonds) and during first actions (empty diamonds).
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5 Hierarchy influence analysis (excluding defectors)
In Figs. S13, S14 and S15 we present the scatterplots of Figs. S10, S11 and S12
excluding defector participants from the analysis. All mean values are thus
computed in a different way while the other points remain the ones from
previous section. Here, we can observe more clearly that average values for
high and low profile participants are rather different (more discussion on the
hierarchy influence in the main text). These results are related to those of
Fig. 6 of the main text.
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Figure S13: Hierarchy influence per hierarchy type. Each point repre-
sents a participant during Phase II in SH treatments where its coordinates
are fhigh (y-axis) and flow (x-axis). We plot mean values per hierarchy pro-
file for all participants cumulated over all rounds (crossed diamonds) and
during first actions (empty diamonds). We exclude defector participants,
i.e. subjects who cooperated, on average, less than 20% of the time.
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Figure S14: Hierarchy influence per hierarchy type. Each point repre-
sents a participant during Phase II in CH treatments where its coordinates
are fhigh (y-axis) and flow (x-axis). We plot mean values per hierarchy pro-
file for all participants cumulated over all rounds (crossed diamonds) and
during first actions (empty diamonds). We exclude defector participants,
i.e. subjects who cooperated, on average, less than 20% of the time.
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Figure S15: Hierarchy influence per hierarchy type. Each point repre-
sents a participant during Phase II in RH treatments where its coordinates
are fhigh (y-axis) and flow (x-axis). We plot mean values per hierarchy pro-
file for all participants cumulated over all rounds (crossed diamonds) and
during first actions (empty diamonds). We exclude defector participants,
i.e. subjects who cooperated, on average, less than 20% of the time.
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